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Hypothetical Question
to the trustee might not have rendered the trust taxable under the powers-
considered-as-a-whole doctrine of the State Street Trust case had the
grantor been a trustee.
The question posed by the State Street Trust case of whether the
emphasis will now shift from a consideration of the adequacy of the
imposed external standard to the reality of the discretion actually con-
ferred upon the trustee in determining the estate tax under section 2038
of the Code has not yet been answered.8"
CONCLUSION
In summary, it might be stated that the existence of certain powers
affecting enjoyment held by the decedent-transferror will render the
property transferred includible in the gross estate: the power to revest
himself with beneficial ownership, the power to shift interests among
designated beneficiaries, and the power to change beneficiaries. Section
2038 law is well defined regarding these transfers. The last of this
broad classification of transfer powers, that is, the power to accelerate
beneficial interests by invasion of either income or corpus, is less well
defined. The Jennings-State Street Trust controversy is yet emerging.
Whether the adequate external standard will be sustained as a principle
of taxability or be discarded in favor of some test which will measure
taxation on the basis of the actual amount of discretion retained by the
decedent-trustee instead cannot yet be known. In the meantime, plan-
ners had best keep their standards external and adequate and see to it
that the administrative and management powers reserved do not aggre-
gate too much.
FRANK BERNDT
The Expert Witness and the Hypothetical Question
The use of an expert witness during the course of a trial may be
necessary when the issue or fact in question requires testimony which
cannot be supplied by a lay witness due to the complicated or scientific
nature of the subject. In today's world of science and mechanization
the use of an expert witness is an important aspect of numerous cases,
and every attorney should be well educated regarding the proper use of
such a witness.
This article will deal with the use of the hypothetical question on
88. In this connection see also Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1960), in which the "absolute discretion" given the trustee rendered the estate includible
for tax purposes even though this discretion was to be exercised in cases of "special emergency."
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direct examination of an expert witness. The rules which must be fol-
lowed and the problems which arise out of them will be discussed. For
example, what problems are involved when there are no eyewitnesses to
an occurrence and there is a missing fact in the chain of causation? Can
the opinion of an expert witness, in reply to a hypothetical question
concerning ultimate causation, supply the missing fact in the chain of
causation, or must there be additional evidence to support his opinion
as to the missing fact? Further, what is the effect of expert testimony
in relation to the ultimate issue in a case?
The use of the hypothetical question is an important and effective
weapon in the arsenal of an attorney. However, an attorney must use
care to insure that he is not misusing the hypothetical question for this
may result in grounds for reversible error.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
Before a hypothetical question can be propounded to an expert wit-
ness, it must be established that the witness is an expert in the field
upon which he is to be examined.' The decision of who is and who is
not an expert properly rests with the discretion of the trial court.2 Once
the witness has been established as an expert, it must be recognized that
the purpose of expert testimony is to aid the court and jury in determin-
ing issues in areas where the expert has special knowledge or experience
which the average man does not possess.' Such would be the case where
testimony involves the specialized treatment of the human eye.4 With-
out the testimony of an eye specialist or a similar expert, a lay jury
and even the court would be practically helpless in arriving at an intelli-
gent and reasonable decision as to any technical issue involved.
With this in mind, it should be noted that there are two methods
which may be used to elicit expert testimony. An expert may be ex-
amined directly with regard to his personal knowledge of a subject, or he
can be examined through the use of the hypothetical question.'
Questions Based on Assumed Facts
If the hypothetical question is used, it must be based on facts assumed
to be true for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the expert on the
1. Donaldson v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 156 A.2d 835 (1959); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 560
(3 ed. 1940).
2. Donaldson v. Maffucci, supra note 1; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 561 (3 ed. 1940).
3. Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Ill. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915).
4. Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (6th Cir. 1897); see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 31 (1950),
which deals with proximate cause in malpractice cases.
5. Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039 (1958).
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assumed facts involved.' In addition, the general rule is that the hypo-
thetical question must be based on the material facts in the record if the
expert's opinion is to be given any probative value.7 In O'Donnell v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company8 a hypothetical question
was asked of an expert witness. The witness was to assume that the
deceased was found dead in a bathtub, his face immersed in water, and
that an autopsy showed that the deceased had drowned. The court
determined that the question was improper because it assumed as a fact
that there had been an autopsy when in fact there had been no evidence
offered to establish the fact of an autopsy. For this reason, the court
upheld the lower court's decision in sustaining an objection to the hypo-
thetical question. This case dearly points out the necessity that the
question be based on the material facts in the record.
However, it appears that in certain instances it is not objectionable,
or at least not reversible error, to include harmless facts in a hypothetical
question even where the facts are not established by evidence in the
record.' This is the proper -approach, especially in cases where the factual
situations are often complex and confusing. In most instances the ex-
pert should be able to distinguish between dhe crucial facts and merely
subsidiary facts when answering the question. This is a matter that
should be left to the sole discretion of the. trial judge in order to elimi-
nate unnecessary appeals which are time consuming and costly to all
parties involved, as well as the public as a whole.
It is further incumbent on the party propounding the hypothetical
question that the material facts assumed be established by a preponder-
6. A workable definition of a hypothetical question is to be found in BLACK, LAw DIcrION-
ARY (4th ed. 1951), where it is defined as "A combination of assumed or proved facts and
circumstances, stated in such form as to constitute a coherent and specific situation or state of
facts, upon which the opinion of an expert is asked, by way of evidence on a trial."
7. In Lynn v. Estadt, 118 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Ohio C.P. 1953), the court stated, ".., an expert
opinion can be no better than the evidence to support the hypothetical question that invokes
it and'that when any one of the material facts contained in such question as an assumption
of fact is successfully contradicted by the manifest weight of the evidence it then follows that
the opinion itself is thereby rendered valueless as inconsequential and as irrelevant to the
issue..... See also Viant v. Town of Lowell, 177 Ind. App. 354, 72 N.R.2d 239 (1947);
Slamey v. Rizzo, 146 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Spidel v. Warrick 83 Ohio App.
332, 78 N.E.2d 746 (1948); Hudson v. Hoster, 47 N.E.2d 895 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
8. 189 Pa. Super. 377, 150 A.2d 146 (1959). For an earlier, but an excellent case in this
area, see Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 57 N.E. 757 (1900).
9. In Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 102 At. 338 (1917), a hypothetical question was pro-
pounded to a medical expert which included as an assumed fact the presence of a bandage
outside of a plaster cast. The court stated that although there was no evidence of such a
bandage the inclusion of that fact in the hypothetical question was harmless. The court
pointed out that the expert's testimony was in no way based on the presence of the bandage
but was completely based on the presence of the plaster cast alone. See Mahone v. Birming-
ham Electric Co., 261 Ala. 697, 73 So. 2d 378 (1954). In this case plaintiff's own subsequent
testimony rendered harmless a possible objectionable hypothetical question propounded by
defendant to a expert witness and thus removed the question from the area of reversible error.
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ance of the evidence.'" However, this rule appears to be directed toward
the weight to be given to the opinion of the expert and not to the de-
termination of whether the hypothetical question is objectionable on the
ground of not being based upon facts in the record." In the case of
In re Jacobson's Guardianship2 the California Supreme Court stated
that the facts assumed could be disputed facts and that a hypothetical
question was proper as long as it was based upon facts within the
"... . possible or probable range of the evidence and if it is not unfair or
misleading."' 3  As a result of these decisions, it appears that a court
should not take it upon itself to refuse to allow a hypothetical question
solely on the ground that it believes that the facts upon which the
question is based are not established by a preponderance of the evidence.' 4
This is appropriately a matter for the jury to determine in considering
how much weight to give to the expert's opinion.
Omission of a Material Fact
Another ground for sustaining an objection to a hypothetical ques-
tion occurs when a material fact is omitted from the question asked of an
expert witness. In Chapman v. Industrial Commission 5 the decedent
died of tuberculosis. Plaintiff propounded a hypothetical question to
two medical experts to obtain their respective opinions regarding the
question of causal connection between the decedent's death and his work.
The nature of the decedent's work subjected him to a considerable amount
of dust. The only evidence in the record showed that the decedent
wore a mask to protect himself from the dust. However, included in
the hypothetical question in relation to the wearing of a mask was the
statement: "So many of the workers wore masks and others did not."
The court stated:
... the omission of a circumstance which would vitally affect the con-
clusion of the witness makes such question objectionable. To say that
'some of the workers wore masks and others did not,' when the only
10. In Kavas v. Barry, 134 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), the court was of the
opinion: "We observe further, that the court in its charge omitted to instruct the jury that it
was incumbent on plaintiff to establish the premise included in the hypothetical question by a
preponderance of the evidence .. " See also Haas v. Kundz, 94 Ohio St. 238, 113 N.E. 826
(1916).
11. In Haddad v. Jahn, 174 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960), the court stated:
"The facts may be in dispute and, if so, it is the function of the jury to determine -where the
truth lies. If the jury finds that the facts stated in the hypothetical question are not supported
by a preponderance of the evidence, the opinion of the expert is of no value and may be dis-
regarded by the jury. The court determines the competency of the evidence but the jury deter-
mines the weight and value to be given to such testimony....
12. 30 Cal. 2d 312, 182 P.2d 537 (1947).
13. Id. at 324, 182 P.2d 544.
14. See Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, 251 Minn. 285, 87 N.W.2d 651 (1958).
15. 81 NE.2d 626 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
[Vol 13:4
Hypothetical Question
evidence in the record as to the conduct of the deceased is that he was
one who did wear a mask, makes the hypothetical question subject to
objection and to overrule such objection constitutes prejudicial error.18
Thus, the omission of a material fact in this case made the experts'
testimony worthless."
However, it must be noted that where the hypothetical question
omits material facts that are disputed by the party propounding the
question, the question will not be objectionable on the ground of omis-
sion of a material fact." This rule is reasonable when it is recognized
that additional facts or theories supported by the opposition can be
brought out on cross-examination of the same expert witness."9 Thus,
each party is provided the opportunity to examine an expert witness on
a reasonable theory most favorable to himself. As a result, the jury has
an equal opportunity to compare and decide which set of facts have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence in determining the weight
to be given to the expert's testimony.
Some courts have gone even further in liberalizing the rules dealing
with hypothetical questions. These courts hold that it is not objectionable
to omit even a material fact provided such omission does not mislead
the jury to the prejudice of the opposing party.o Under this rule both
parties are allowed complete freedom in stating their theory of the case
since the omitted fact does not even have to be a disputed fact. Each
party may formulate hypothetical questions and elicit opinions on any
possible set of facts as long as the facts are based on evidence in the
record, reasonably state the party's theory of the case, and are an aid to
16. Id. at 630.
17. In Storbakken v. Soderberg, 246 Minn. 434, 75 N.W.2d 496 (1956), a hypothetical
question was asked of an expert in which the expert was to give his opinion as to the rate of
speed various vehicles had approached an intersection. One of the vehicles was towing an
Auger and this fact was omitted from the question. It was held that the answers of the expert
were not inadmissible because such an omission could only have been favorable to the party
objecting.
18. Dickerson v. Shepard Warner Elevator Co., 287 F.2d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1961). The
court said: '"Where... the party propounding such question disputes the truth of the so-called
quaifying fact, or it cannot be said that the omitted fact was an integral or necessary part of
the factual premise to the expert's conclusion, it is not essential that such fact be included in
the question." (Emphasis added.) See also Cook v. Coleman, 90 W. Va. 748, 111 S.E. 750
(1922), where the court held it was not necessary for a plaintiff to include inconsistent and
contradictory contentions of facts submitted by the opposition.
19. Ranger v. Equiable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 196 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1952).
20. Briggs v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 248 Minm. 418, 429, 80 N.W.2d 625, 634-35
(1957). The court stated: "Long ago this court pointed out that the technical rules as to
hypothetical questions are relaxing and this is a step in the right direction. Although the
hypothetical question must embody substantially all admitted or undisputed facts relating to
the ultimate issue, and should also include facts which the jury might reasonably find to be
true, it does not follow that the failure to include all pertinent or material facts is a basis for
a reversal as long as the jury was not misled to the prejudice of the adverse party... :'
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the jury in determining the issues in question.2 This would appear to
be the proper approach.
It is important to note that material facts brought out in a trial
subsequent to the framing of a hypothetical question are not to be con-
sidered as material facts, the absence of which renders the question objec-
tionable at a later date.22 The logical reason for this is that the question
would be based on facts assumed to be true for which there is evidence in
the record at the time the question was asked. If certain material facts
are brought out subsequent to the question, it would be impossible to
assume them to be true before they are even brought to light. While
a hypothetical question is not objectionable because it did not include
material facts subsequently brought out during a case, the same facts
when finally brought out may greatly affect or destroy the weight of
the expert's opinion.2 In such a case the jury still has the right to con-
sider the expert's testimony. However, it is suggested that an alert coun-
sel should call to the jury's attention the possible effect of the subse-
quent facts when the same seriously alter the probative value of the
expert's opinion.
However, this is not the complete picture, for under certain circum-
stances it is not objectionable to base a hypothetical question upon evi-
dence which has not yet been offered to the court.24 This is permissible
where the party framing the question assures the court that he will pro-
duce such evidence at a later time and substantially keeps his promise
to the satisfaction of the court. This technique is often a risky under-
taking and should be granted by a court only in instances where counsel
can adequately show urgent necessity. This is advisable because once
the expert states his opinion to the jury it can never actually be recalled
even though the judge may grant a motion to strike and instruct the
jury not to consider the testimony for a lack of subsequent supporting
evidence.
21. In Sneed v. Goldsmith, 343 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), the plaintiff was injured
in an automobile collision and subsequently had a miscarriage. Plaintiff's counsel propounded
a hypothetical question to a medical expert who had examined plaintiff twenty-five days after
the collision. The question included the facts, assumed as true, that plaintiff had experienced
pain in various parts of her body including the abdomen. Over defendant's objection that
the question omitted various material facts dealing with the nature of plaintiff's injuries and
assumed the fact that plaintiff had received blows to her stomach, the trial court permitted
the expert to testify that in his opinion the miscarriage was caused by the accident.
In sustaining the trial court's position the Missouri Court of Appeals stated: "Under the
law the questioner may frame his hypothetical question on his own theory and may not include
all the material facts in evidence. He may elicit an opinion on any combination or set of
facts he may choose, if the question propounded fairly hypothesizes facts the evidence tends
to prove and fairly presents the questioner's theory so that the answer will be of assistance to
the jury on the issue." Id. at 351.
22. 1a re Telsrow's Estate, 237 Iowa 672, 22 N.W.2d 792 (1946).
23. Gleba v. City of New Britain, 133 Conn. 85, 48 A.2d 227 (1946).
24. Sanchez v. Board of County Comrn'rs, 63 N.M. 85, 313 P.2d 1055 (1957).
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Additional Factors
In addition to the factors previously set forth, there are further con-
siderations which should be taken into account when formulating a hypo-
thetical question to an expert witness. One of these concerns the
problem of whether to allow an expert to give an opinion which is
founded upon evidence derived from another expert's opinion.
The Ohio Supreme Court has taken a reasonable position on this
problem. In Zelenka v. Industrial Commission25 the defendant pro-
pounded to medical experts a hypothetical question which was founded
upon the assumption that all the facts were true in twenty-three exhibits.
These exhibits included medical and hospital records, various X-rays,
and other doctors' interpretations of the X-rays. The experts had never
seen or treated the deceased party in question, and all of the facts were
presented by reference to records rather than by actual recitation in the
question. On the basis of this the experts answered that in their opinion
there was no causal connection between the injury that the deceased had
received and his subsequent death. The Ohio Supreme Court in decid-
ing that the opinions of these experts were without probative value
stated in the syllabus of the court ' the following:
An expert witness may not express his opinion based upon evidence
which he has heard or read on the assumption that the facts supported
thereby are true, where such evidence is voluminous, complicated or
conflicting or consists of the opinions, inferences and conclusions of
other witnesses 27
This position appears to be sound especially when the expert must
base his opinion on hospital records which are for the most part merely
opinions of other doctors. Here there is no opportunity to cross-examine
the doctor who wrote his opinion in the hospital record, and it is im-
possible to tell if his opinion was a guess, was based on the past history
of the patient, or was based on the opinions of other doctors.2" Although
it will result in hardship in some cases, Ohio seems to be committed to the
position of requiring that specific facts be assumed as true and that they
be specially recited in the hypothetical question when those facts are
part of a voluminous hospital record or another expert's opinion.,,
25. 165 Ohio St. 587, 138 N.E.2d 667 (1956).
26. In Ohio the syllabus of the court is written by the supreme court of the state. The sylla-
bus is the controlling law of the case, but it must be read in light of the facts and issues of
the case. See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
27. Zelenka v. Industrial Comm'n., 165 Ohio St. 587, 587, 138 N.E.2d 667, 668 (1956).
28. See Estes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 99 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio C.P. 1951), for an
excellent discussion on the dangers in allowing expert testimony to be founded on the opinion
of another expert.
29. However, in Zelenka v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 587, 593, 138 N.E.2d 667,
671 (1956), the court did say that the trial court has discretion ". . . to permit an expert
witness to give an opinion based upon the assumption of the truth of testimony which he has
19621
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It is also important to note that where physical facts dash with
the testimony of an expert witness the physical facts must prevail. In
such a case neither the court nor the jury are permitted to grant any
probative value to an expert's opinion so contradicted."0
EXPERT WITNESS SUPPLYING A MISSING FACT
An area which is often the breeding ground of considerable trouble
both to courts and counsel is the area dealing with the assumption of
facts in a hypothetical question propounded to an expert witness. As
was stated earlier, the facts which are assumed in a hypothetical question
are facts which the expert is required to accept as true for the purposes of
the question. When counsel erroneously includes a fact which is not
based on evidence in the record, the question generally will not go to
the jury for consideration."' Likewise, courts are not hesitant in exercis-
ing their judicial discretion in sustaining objections to hypothetical ques-
tions when the expert himself assumes additional facts not based on
evidence in the record.3 2
However, questions do arise when a trial court permits an expert
witness to testify, over the objection of the opposition, in relation to the
issue of causation when one of the material facts relating to causation
is absent. The issue in the appellate court generally narrows down to
whether or not an expert witness should be permitted to supply the miss-
ing fact in the chain of causation by means of his opinion regarding the
ultimate cause, when that same fact is necessary to support such an
opinion regarding causation. This problem is especially acute when there
are no eyewitnesses to an occurrence.
At first glance, it would seem to be the better rule to permit an
expert witness to supply a missing fact through his opinion testimony
alone. An injured party may go without compensation for a wrong
when it is nearly impossible to establish a fact by a preponderance of
evidence. As a result, it would seem logical to accept the opinion of an
expert stating that the missing fact did exist because the expert should
possess greater knowledge than anyone else (except another expert)
about his field. An argument can be made that the right decision will
be reached in the great majority of cases where an expert is allowed to
heard given by other witnesses without a hypothetical statement of the facts, where the wit-
nesses are few and the testimony is not voluminous, complicated, or conflicting."
30. Differential Steel Car Co. v. MacDonald, 180 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1950).
31. Minnick v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 525, 144 N.E.2d 227 (1956); DeHaan
v. Winter, 258 Mich. 283, 241 N.W. 923 (1932).
32. See Hulsizer v. Johnson-Brennan Constr. Co., 339 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Ark. Sup. Ct.
1960), where the court stated: "Superior knowledge is a wonderful attribute; but an expert
in answering a hypothetical question must base the answer on admitted facts and cannot as-
sume facts contrary to or in addition to the admitted facts.... "
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supply a missing fact through his opinion alone, since it is presumed
that a jury will use prudence in finally determining the issue. Possibly
the question should be left up to the discretion of the trial judge. He
could make exceptions in cases where a fact is almost impossible to prove,
as where there are no eyewitnesses, while refusing to allow an expert to
supply a missing fact where it could possibly be established through other
means.
On the other hand, serious problems may result if experts are allowed
to supply missing facts. For example, would it take one or twelve
experts to testify that in their opinion a certain fact was present in the
chain of causation? It is very possible that any given number of experts
will disagree as to the existence of the fact in question. Others may
qualify their opinions which would further confuse the issue. Further,
the missing fact could be one of several different factors which might
result in a mere guess from the expert. Probably the main objection to
this idea would be that even if a court should allow an expert's opinion
to supply one fact, where would this stop? Should a court permit the
opinion of an expert or experts to supply two or three missing facts? If
this were to be permitted the courts would soon have to abandon
altogether the principle of requiring the facts to be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
This is a policy decision, and the choice seems to have been made in
favor of requiring the party propounding the question to establish the
fact by other means than an expert's opinion. In Dreher v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers of America 8 plaintiff's husband was found
dead in the garage with the car engine running. There was a reddish
spot on his right temple. There was no evidence as to what caused the
spot or that he was struck by anything, and there were no eyewitnesses
to the death of the deceased. A medical expert, in response to a hypo-
thetical question propounded by plaintiff, testified that in his opinion
the deceased died as a result of some external violence as shown by the
mark on the deceased's temple. The trial court directed a verdict for
defendant which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The
court stated:
The only evidence.., from which it may be inferred that external injury
caused the death is the evidence of the doctor that a blow which caused
the mark on his temple might have caused death, and that because he
was dead it was his opinion that he died as the result of such a blow.
The opinion of the physician as to the cause of death is invoked to
supply the substantive facts necessary to support his conclusion. This
cannot be done.... The basis of the conclusion cannot be deduced or
inferred from the conclusion itself. In other words, the opinion of the
33. 173 Wis. 178, 180 N.W. 815 (1921).
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expert does not constitute proof of the existence of the facts necessary
to support the opinion 34
In Steckman v. Silver Moon3 5 the deceased sustained a skull fracture
when he hit his head on the sidewalk during a fight with defendant.
Plaintiff charged that defendant and others took the deceased to his
room (while he was still alive) and failed to get medical attention for
him. Plaintiff further charged that the deceased's injuries were aggra-
vated when he fell while trying to get out of bed. There was no evidence
in the record that deceased had fallen from his bed, especially with such
force as to result in additional brain injury. Yet, this fact was assumed
as true in a hypothetical question propounded by plaintiff to a medical
expert in order to obtain his opinion regarding the probability that such
an aggravation of head injuries resulted in death. The court stated:
The opinion of the physician as to the cause of death could not be
invoked to supply a fact necessary to support his conclusion. The sus-
taining of objections to these hypothetical questions was not error 36
This reasoning appears to be sound in light of the fact that there were
no eyewitnesses to establish that the deceased actually fell from bed and,
if so, with what force.
The Ohio position on this problem appears to have been definitely
settled by two decisions handed down by the Ohio Supreme Court in
1955." These decisions leave little room to debate the fact that Ohio
also refuses to allow an expert to supply a missing fact in the chain of
causation solely through his opinion as to the ultimate cause. Similar
decisions are to be found in Idaho,"8 Wisconsin," Connecticut,40 and
New Jersey.
41
OPINION OF AN EXPERT REGARDING THE ULTIMATE ISSUE
A question which frequently arises when dealing with expert witnesses
is whether the opinion expressed by such a witness with regard to the
ultimate issue invades the province of the jury. According to one line
34. Id. at 178-79, 180 N.W. at 817.
35. 77 S.D. 206, 90 N.W.2d 170 (1958).
36. Id. at 212, 90 N.W.2d at 174.
37. In Burens v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 549, 556, 124 N.E.2d 724, 729 (1955),
the court stated: ". . . the fact of striking the shelves before the coronary attack should have
been a premise presented to the witness, which, if found by the jury to be true, could then have
formed a basis for the acceptance of the expert opinion as to causation. Failure to include
such premise renders the opinion defective for the reason that it assumes as true the critical
issue involved in the cause, an assumption that was without the province of the expert witness."
See also Olsen v. Electric Autolite Co., 164 Ohio St. 283, 130 N.E.2d 363 (1955).
38. Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 Pac. 289 (1921).
39. McGaw v. Wassman, 263 Wis. 486, 57 N.W.2d 920 (1953).
40. Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560 (1950).
41. Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 108 A.2d 616 (1954);
Carroll v. Newark Printing Co., 25 N.J. Super. 528, 96 A.2d 728 (Essex County Ct. 1953);
see also Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 13, 46-47 (1954).
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of reasoning, it is objectionable for an expert to express his opinion on
the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.42 Likewise, it would be
objectionable to frame a hypothetical question to an expert that would
elicit an answer stating the expert's opinion as to the proximate cause
rather than what would probably follow the facts as hypothesized.43 At
least one jurisdiction has differentiated between situations where the
facts are in dispute and those where the facts are not in dispute.44 The
practice followed in this type of jurisdiction is to allow the expert to
answer that a certain set of facts did cause a certain result only when the
facts of the case are not disputed. However, when the facts are in dis-
pute, the expert may only reply that the facts could result in a certain
situation, and it would be an invasion of the province of the jury for the
expert to say the facts did occasion the result.
In this writer's opinion the better rule is to allow an expert to express
his opinion based on facts in a hypothetical question even though it is
on the ultimate issue before the jury. This rule has been followed in
some jurisdictions. In Patrick v. Smith45 plaintiff's well failed shortly
after an explosion on a railroad right of way adjoining the plaintiff's
land. A hypothetical question based on proper assumed facts was pro-
pounded to two mining engineers concerning the causal relation between
the explosion and the failure of the plaintiff's well. Defendants objected,
claiming that the experts' opinion would be upon the same issue the jury
was to decide. However, the experts were allowed to testify that in their
opinion the explosion caused the loss of water in plaintiff's well.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing a long line of cases,46 at-
42. Carroll v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 223 F.2d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 1955). The court
stated: "It must always be remembered that the jury is sitting to hear and decide the facts,
and in a case like this one, to determine the real cause of the accident. There is an ever pres-
ent danger that an expert witness may invade, indeed, usurp the jury's province by giving an
opinion upon the ultimate issue to be decided .... "
43. Underwood v. Smith, 261 Ala. 181, 73 So. 2d 717 (1954).
44. DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N.W. 69 (1933).
45. 75 Wash. 407, 134 Pac. 1076 (1913).
46. In Illinois Central R.R. v. Smith, 208 Ill. 608, 70 N.E. 628 (1904), the court was of
the opinion that it would be an invasion of the province of the jury to allow a medical expert
to testify as to what "did cause" an injury. However, the expert could testify as to what
"might" have caused the injury. In City of Chicago v. Didier, 227 Ill. 571, 81 N.E. 698
(1907), the court held that an expert could testify as to what "did cause" an injury only in
cases where there was no dispute about the manner of injury and where the area involved was
one appropriate for expert testimony. However, where the evidence conflicted as to the man-
ner of injury the expert could only testify as to what "might" have caused the injury. In
Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry., 272 Ill. 71, 111 NE. 499 (1916), the court was of the
opinion that where evidence conflicted as to the manner of injury the expert could not testify
that a set of facts assumed to be true "did cause" the injury in question. However, an expert
could give his opinion as to whether the injury "may or could" result from and be caused by
the assumed facts in the hypothetical question. Finally, in People v. Rongetti, 338 IIL. 36,
170 N.E. 14 (1929), the court held that an expert could not state what "did cause" an injury,
but he could be asked whether from a medical point of view the facts assumed in a hypothetical
question were sufficient to cause a certain result.
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rived at the conclusion in Clifford-Jacobs Forging Company v. Industrial
Commission47 that it made no difference whether the party propounding
a hypothetical question framed it so as to elicit an opinion on "what
did" or "what might" cause a certain result."s This appears to be the
proper approach to a controversial subject. In reality, such testimony
is the opinion of an expert in the field based on facts supported by
evidence in the record. Hence, such an opinion should be acceptable
even when it deals directly with the ultimate issue before the jury for it
may be of help to the jury who still retain the task of making a final
decision on the matter.
Ohio also follows the line of reasoning expressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
A well recognized exception to the rule which excludes opinion evidence
is found in a situation . . . where it is necessary to admit deductions
from observed facts, which require scientific or specialized knowledge or
experience and for which the general common sense and practical ex-
perience of the jury are inadequate.... 49
Where the opinion of the expert is based partly on his own personal
knowledgee as well as assumed facts in the hypothetical question, an
even stronger case can be made for allowing the expert's opinion to be
directed to the ultimate issue before the jury. The expert's opinion under
such circumstances should be more responsive and of a greater value
to the court and jury than it would be in a case where his opinion is based
only on assumed facts. However, under circumstances where the opinion
of an expert tends to be speculative beyond the point of mere disagree-
ment with other experts, this would probably mislead the jury." Under
these circumstances it would be proper for the trial court to rule against
a hypothetical question propounded to elicit such an opinion. Besides
being misleading, such an opinion would also be an invasion of the
province of the jury.
Regardless of any opinion given by an expert witness in reply to a
47. 19 111. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960).
48. Id. at 243, 166 N.E.2d at 586, where the court stated: "So long as the witness is not
called upon to decide any controverted fact, but is asked to assume the truth of facts testified
to, he may give his opinion thereon in any form. The objection, if any, should be a specific
one directed to that which might improperly be incorporated or deleted from the hypothetical
question."
49. Burens v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 549, 552, 124 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1955).
See also Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949);
Baird v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 168 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
50. In Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 229, 320 P.2d 1039, 1051 (1958),
the court was of the opinion: "It is not fatal to a hypothetical question that it includes the
personal knowledge of the expert witness when the extent of that knowledge is proved, so that
the actual basis of the witness's opinion is in fact disclosed .. ." See also Curtis v. Fruin-
Colon Contracting Co., 363 Mo. 676, 253 S.W.2d 158 (1952); Golden v. National Util.
Co., 356 Mo. 84, 201 S.W.2d 292 (1947).
51. Johnson v. Toscano, 144 Conn. 582, 136 A.2d 341 (1957).
Hypothetical Question
hypothetical question which touches the ultimate issue before the jury,
the jury still has an important function remaining. The jury must sift
through all of the evidence offered to determine which facts have been
supported by the preponderance of evidence. Once this has been done
it becomes apparent than an expert's opinion is entitled to only such
weight as the jury wishes to give it."2 It has been said, "Such opinion
evidence is but to supplement and not to supplant the judgment of the
jury . ..."" It should be remembered that even though a hypothetical
question is not based on all of the facts (even material facts), this does
not affect the admissibility of the opinion as long as it is not misleading.
However, the jury may take this into consideration when deciding how
much weight to give to the expert's opinion.5" This is also the proper
approach for a court to follow when attempting to decide whether to
direct a verdict for either of the parties in a case.
CONCLUSION
Certain definite rules must be followed by counsel when framing a
hypothetical question to an expert witness. As a general rule, the facts
assumed as true in a hypothetical question must be found in the record
and established by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthemore, the
omission of a material fact from a hypothetical question may result in
the question being objectionable, or at least in mitigating the value of
the expert's opinion,
In addition, an expert should not be allowed to supply a missing
material fact in the chain of causation through his opinion as to the
ultimate cause. However, he should be allowed to state his opinion in
regards to the ultimate issue where the opinion is not speculative and
does not mislead the jury.
It is suggested that the strictness and exactness so often required by
courts in the past is giving way to a more liberal and functional use of
the hypothetical question. As a result, this is increasing the discretion of
the trial court in matters dealing with a hypothetical question. This
is desirable in areas where factual situations are often extremely complex
and of a technical nature.
WILLIAM A. PAPENBROCK
52. Lovich v. Salvation Army, 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947).
53. Id. at 323, 75 N-2d at 462.
54. Permanente Metals Corp. v. Pista, 154 .2d 568 (9th Cir. 1946).
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